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Recent Developments
A Failure to Comply: An Initial
Assessment of Gaps in IOM’s Medical
Device Study Committee
Ralph F. Hall* & Eva Stensvad**
“With great power comes great responsibility” 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

In addition to addressing traditional scientific and clinical
inquiries, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) is engaged in policy
analysis and recommendations. 2 Because of IOM’s strong
reputation, 3 IOM committees play a powerful role in public
policy. Yet, despite this power, IOM committees operate in a
largely closed fashion. IOM alone determines committee
membership. 4 Committee deliberations are private. 5 Policy
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1. Tammany is Satisfied: Mr. Gilroy Interviewed at New Orleans, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1892.
2. About the IOM, INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last
updated May 1, 2011).
3. Cf.
Membership,
INST.
MED.,
http://www.iom.edu/AboutIOM/Membership.aspx (last updated April 2, 2011).
4. NAT’L ACADS., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE: CHARTER AND BYLAWS 3
(2006),
available
at
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recommendations need not be publicly vetted before being
issued in final form. 6 IOM decides how to operate, what
testimony to elicit, and what studies to conduct. 7 Conversely,
government committees and policy development operate in a
much more public and transparent fashion. 8
Because of its great power, IOM has a great responsibility
to ensure that its processes and committee membership include
all key stakeholders, are fair and unbiased, and are viewed as
such. The strength of IOM committee recommendations
depends on the quality and completeness of its research and
analysis and, equally importantly, on stakeholder acceptance of
the fairness and robustness of its processes. A committee that
lacks essential expertise and key stakeholder involvement risks
not only producing a report and recommendations that are
incomplete or incorrect, but also producing a report that lacks
the trust of stakeholders.
Unfortunately, IOM’s Committee on the Public Health
Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process has been
subject to substantial criticism for not being inclusive or open. 9
More importantly, the Committee has been roundly criticized
for major gaps or omissions in committee membership. 10 The
shortcomings with this Committee’s composition and processes
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/About%20the%20IOM/charter-andbylaws.pdf (“The membership of committees conducting studies and preparing
reports for dissemination outside the Institute and the National Research
Council shall be appointed by the President, subject to approval by the
Chairman of the National Research Council.”).
MED.,
5. Federal
Advisory
Committee
Act,
INST.
http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM/Study-Process/FACA.aspx (last updated Feb.
8, 2011).
6. Id.
7. Policies
and
Procedures,
NAT’L
RES.
COUNCIL,
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/NRC/PoliciesandProcedures/index.htm (last
visited May 9, 2011).
8. WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40520, FEDERAL
ADVISORY
COMMITTEES:
AN
OVERVIEW
(2009),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40520.pdf.
9. See, e.g., Impact of Medical Device Regulation on Jobs and Patients:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce,
112th
Cong.
62
(2011),
available
at
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/image_uploads/
Transcript_MedDevice.pdf
(preliminary
transcript)
(questioning
the
composition of the IOM panel).
10. Id.; see also Letter from Sen. John Kerry to Margaret Ann Hamburg,
Commissioner, Food & Drug Admin. (Apr. 13, 2011).
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threaten the strength of the analysis and stakeholders’
acceptance of its recommendations. These issues are so serious
that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may be
legally prohibited from using any of the 510(k) Committee’s
recommendations.
This article questions whether IOM’s 510(k) Committee
complies with statutory requirements and good process. We do
not yet know the Committee’s recommendations, and so our
concerns are not influenced by any disagreement with the
Committee’s conclusions. We also are not questioning the
talents of current Committee members—individually they have
impressive credentials and specific subject matter expertise.
Rather, we question the omissions from the Committee of
essential expertise and stakeholders. These critical issues
should be addressed immediately to preserve IOM’s reputation,
ensure fairness, and permit FDA to use the Committee’s report.
This article contends that, while the IOM can be an
invaluable policy resource, IOM’s 510(k) Committee,
unfortunately, does not comply with federal law. Therefore,
FDA is legally prohibited from using any report from this IOM
Committee when deciding what changes to make to the 510(k)
process. In order to prevent problems, it may be best for IOM
not to issue any report from this Committee until these issues
get resolved.
II. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE IOM 510(K)
COMMITTEE
FDA is responsible for advancing the public health by
providing reasonable assurance that medical devices are safe
and effective and also by promoting innovation. 11 Assuring
safety and efficacy for patients entails expensive and timeconsuming approval processes, while promoting innovation
requires making beneficial medical devices available to
physicians and patients faster and less expensively. FDA
balances these two goals—patient protection and innovation—
through its approval processes. The device is first assigned to
one of three risk-based classifications. This classification

11. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 393(b) (2006);
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
What
We
Do,
U.S.
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/default.htm (last updated Nov. 18,
2010).
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determines the applicable FDA approval process. 12
High-risk medical devices 13 are subject to Premarket
Approval (PMA), 14 a rigorous, time-consuming, and expensive
process. 15 In comparison, moderate-risk devices 16 can be
cleared for market through the faster and less resourceintensive Premarket Notification (PMN) or “510(k)” clearance
process. 17 The 510(k) process allows a new device to enter the
market if the new device is “substantially equivalent” to a
510(k) product already legally on the market (a “predicate”
device). 18 Many more products go through the 510(k) process
than the PMA process. 19 Furthermore, because the 510(k)
12. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006).
13. High-risk, or “Class III,” medical devices are those for which
“insufficient information exists to determine that the application of general
controls are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness” and typically include devices that are “purported or represented
to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health” or “[which
present] a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.” 21 U.S.C. §
360c(a)(1)(c) (2006). Examples of high-risk devices approved through the PMA
process include heart valves and implantable pacemakers. General and
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
Special
Controls,
U.S.
FOOD
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/G
eneralandSpecialControls/ucm2005378.htm (last updated Apr. 23, 2009).
14. 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2006).
15. Premarket Approval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 3,
2010),
http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/howtomarket
yourdevice/premarketsubmissions/premarketapprovalpma/default.htm.
16. Low-risk, or “Class I,” medical devices are those for which general
controls, such as manufacturing practices, are adequate to ensure safety and
effectiveness. 21 C.F.R. § 850.2(c)(1). Moderate-risk, or “Class II,” medical
devices are those for which both general and specific controls, including
postmarket surveillance and additional FDA guidelines, are required to
ensure safety and effectiveness. Id. § 860.3(c)(2).
17. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2006). Products cleared through the 510(k) process
include angioplasty catheters and blood glucose monitors. 510(k) Premarket
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
Notification,
U.S.
FOOD
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpmn/pmn.cfm
(last
updated May 9, 2011).
18. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (2006).
19. In 2009, FDA received more than 3500 510(k) applications as
compared to 20 original PMA applications and 1394 PMA supplements. U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, OFFICE
OF DEVICE EVALUATION, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009 4
(2009),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports
/UCM223893.pdf.

2011]

FAILURE TO COMPLY

735

system requires a less detailed submission to the FDA than is
required for PMA, 510(k) clearances are generally faster than
PMA approvals. 20
Each system assesses the safety and efficacy of the product
as part of the FDA’s statutory mandate to provide a
“reasonable assurance” that a product is safe and effective
before marketing. 21 The 510(k) process makes this safety and
effectiveness determination by assessing whether the product
in question is “substantially equivalent” to a 510(k) device
already legally marketed. 22 In some cases clinical data is
needed for the 510(k) submission. In other cases, bench testing
or compliance with existing government-approved standards is
used to establish safety and effectiveness. 23
The 510(k) process has been criticized by a number of
stakeholders. Some argue that the pathway is too easy,
allowing unsafe, ineffective, or inadequately tested devices on
the market. 24 These stakeholders may argue that all 510(k)
products should be subject to placebo controlled, blinded
clinical trials. 25 Conversely, others argue that it is
unpredictable and burdensome, unnecessarily inhibiting
innovation and patient/physician access to new products. 26 For
these reasons, in September 2009, FDA launched a review of
the 510(k) process. As part of this review, FDA commissioned

20. See id. at 4–9.
21. 21 U.S.C. § 393 (2006).
22. Id. § 360c(i).
23. For examples, see presentations made at the third public meeting of
the 510(k) Committee on July 28, 2010, available at Meeting 3: Public Health
Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process, INST. MED.,
http://www.iom.edu/Activities/PublicHealth/510KProcess/2010-JUL-28.aspx
(last updated July 28, 2010).
24. See, e.g., Jonas Zajac Hines et al., Left to Their Own Devices:
Breakdowns in United States Medical Device Premarket Review, 87 AM. J.
HUM. GENETICS 451 (2010); Comments on FDA 510(k) Medical Devices
Working Group Preliminary Report and Recommendations, PUB. CITIZEN,
http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=4535 (Oct. 4, 2010).
25. See Rita Redberg, Presentation to the Committee on the Public Health
Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process (July 28, 2010), available at
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/PublicHealth/510kProcess/
2010-JUL-28/02%20Redberg.pdf.
26. See, e.g., JOSH MAKOWER ET AL., FDA IMPACT ON U.S. MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION: A SURVEY OF OVER 200 MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY
COMPANIES
(2010),
available
at
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid
=668&Itemid=93.
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the IOM to conduct a detailed analysis of the 510(k) system. 27
As a body of the U.S. National Academies, the IOM is intended
to provide the federal government and others with expert,
independent analysis and recommendations about issues of
health and heath care. 28
In the spring of 2010, IOM created a committee to conduct
this review—with IOM itself deciding the committee’s
membership. 29 The committee held three workshops with
invited speakers and allowed other interested parties five
minutes apiece to address the committee. 30 Other than asking
clarifying questions, the committee did not engage in any
dialogue about specific policy recommendations. The committee
met a number of times in closed session where, presumably, it
debated policy issues and recommendations. 31 The committee
also reviewed submitted material, the content of which is not
public. Finally, according to IOM procedures, there will be no
public input into or discussion of IOM recommendations prior
to the final report. 32
In January 2011, FDA reported twenty-five actions it is

27. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA: Institute of Medicine
to Study Premarket Clearance Process for Medical Devices (Sept. 23, 2009),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm183497.
htm.
28. See COMM. ON THE PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA
510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS, PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FDA
510(K) CLEARANCE PROCESS: BALANCING PATIENT SAFETY AND INNOVATION:
WORKSHOP REPORT, at iv (Theresa Wizemann ed. 2010), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12960&page=R1 (“The Institute
acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its
congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government . . . .”); see
also About the IOM, supra note 4.
ACAS.,
29. Our
Study
Process,
NAT’L
http://www.nationalacademies.org/studyprocess/index.html#st2 (last visited
May 9, 2011).
30. See Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process,
INST. MED., http://www.iom.edu/Activities/PublicHealth/510KProcess.aspx
(last visited April 25, 2011) [hereinafter Public Health Effectiveness].
31. Project: Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance
ACADS.,
Process,
NAT’L
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview.aspx?key=IOM-BPH-09-03
(last visited May 9, 2011) [hereinafter Project].
32. See Our Study Process, supra note 31; see also Federal Advisory
Committee Act, supra note 7 (“All analyses and drafts of the report remain
confidential.”).
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considering to improve the 510(k) program. 33 Importantly, FDA
reconfirmed the importance of the IOM committee report when
it specifically referred seven controversial questions to IOM for
analysis and recommendations. 34 IOM is expected to issue its
final report in the late spring or summer of 2011. 35
III. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR IOM COMMITTEE
MEMBERSHIP
IOM studies of this type are not conducted in a legal
vacuum. Section 15 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA) sets forth rules governing FDA’s use of IOM studies. 36
Enacted in 1972, FACA requires federal advisory committees to
operate openly, efficiently, and objectively to ensure accuracy,
fairness, and public trust. 37 When federal agencies like the
FDA solicit advice from the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS), which includes IOM, the requirements of FACA section
15 apply. Section 15 imposes fewer requirements on IOM
committees than other federal advisory committees, 38 but still
requires minimal inclusivity and public accountability. Section
15 requires fair balance on committees, public notice of
meetings, openness of data-gathering meetings, and public
availability of records. 39 Because there are fewer rules IOM
committees must follow, those rules that do exist take on
heightened importance to ensure transparency, fairness, and
public input. IOM’s own policies and procedures echo (albeit
with more detail) these same basic tenets. 40 If the 510(k)
committee fails to meet these rules, then, by statute, FDA “may
not use any advice or recommendation” provided by this
committee. 41
Section 15 requires that IOM “make its best efforts to
33. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL
HEALTH, PLAN OF ACTION FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF 510(K) AND SCIENCE
RECOMMENDATIONS
(2011),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDRH/CDRHReports
/UCM239450.pdf.
34. Id. at 6.
35. See Project, supra note 33.
36. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2, § 15 (2006).
37. See id. §§ 5–14.
38. Compare id. § 15 (setting forth requirements for NAS committees),
with id. §§ 5–14 (setting forth requirements for federal advisory committees).
39. See id § 15(b).
40. See Our Study Process, supra note 31.
41. 5 U.S.C. app. 2, § 15(a).
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ensure that . . . the committee membership is fairly balanced . .
. for the functions to be performed.” 42 The committee should not
contain any individual with a conflict of interest, unless the
conflict is “unavoidable” and is “promptly and publicly
disclosed.” 43 Any IOM committee that lacks fair balance or that
mishandles conflicts of interest fails to comply with section 15.
It is important to note that section 15 vests a great deal of
discretion in the NAS, stating that “[t]he Academy shall make
its best efforts” to ensure the adequacy of the committee’s
composition and that the Academy determines whether a
conflict is unavoidable. 44 Additionally, the Academy is
responsible for determining whether “the committee
membership is fairly balanced . . . to be appropriate for the
functions to be performed.” 45 Furthermore, the Chair of the
National Research Council (NRC) has “[f]inal authority over
committee appointments,” 46 and the NRC Executive Office and
the General Counsel’s Office jointly determine whether there is
a conflict of interest and whether that conflict is unavoidable. 47
This discretion, however, is not unfettered.
First, FACA clearly states that, while conflicts of interest
are permissible at the Academy’s discretion, fair balance is
necessary. Furthermore, courts, while generally deferential, 48
have on occasion intervened when committees are
unbalanced. 49 While no cases involving an NAS committee’s
fair balance have yet been brought to court, there have been
cases that challenge traditional federal advisory committees
subject to section 5 of FACA, which, similarly to section 15,
42. Id. § 15(b)(1).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 15(b)(1)(A).
45. Id. § 15(b)(1)(B).
46. NAT’L ACADS., POLICY ON COMMITTEE COMPOSITION AND BALANCE
AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR COMMITTEES USED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
REPORTS 7 (2003), available at http://www.nationalacademies.org/coi/bicoi_form-0.pdf.
47. Id. at 8.
48. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir.
1999) (explaining that the fair balance requirement is “subject to a deferential
standard of review”).
49. See, e.g., Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Dep’t of Interior, 26
F.3d 1103 (11th Cir.) (upholding an injunction where a committee tasked with
deciding whether to list a particular species of fish as endangered did not
include any representatives who had an economic interest in that fish
market).
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requires fair balance in committee membership. 50 In cases
implicating section 5, courts look at the specific functions of the
committees to decide whether there is fair balance. When a
committee is charged with a narrow, scientific, or highly
technical mandate, fewer viewpoints and areas of expertise
may be required on the committee. 51 Where the functions to be
performed are not “narrow and explicit,” 52 but instead involve
“diverse and far-reaching issues that affect others,” broader
representation on the committee is required. 53 This is
especially true of committees whose purpose is “to study the
effects of a particular type of regulation . . . on the public.” 54
The key issues in evaluating compliance with FACA, then,
are first determining the committee’s function, and then
figuring out what areas of expertise are required on the
committee to fulfill that function. Importantly, the statutory
requirement of fair balance applies specifically to committee
membership. IOM cannot satisfy this requirement through
other input mechanisms. For example, a lack of balance on the
committee cannot be remedied simply by allowing missing
stakeholders to submit data, make presentations, or serve as
peer reviewers. If these were acceptable alternatives to fair
balance on the committee, then the statute would not explicitly
require such balance on IOM committees themselves. Inclusion
of necessary experts and viewpoints during the data-gathering
and reviewing processes is important, but cannot substitute for
balance among the committee membership. Since the
committee itself privately decides on the content of the final
report and recommendations, balance and expertise is required
on the committee. Anything less violates the statutory
requirements.
The National Academies’ own internal policies regarding

50. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2). Generally, it is fair to presume that Congress
intends a consistent meaning of a phrase when it uses that phrase in several
parts of the same statute. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143
(1994) (“A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally
read the same way each time it appears.”).
51. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999);
Pub. Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on Microbiological Criteria for Foods,
708 F. Supp. 359 (D.D.C. 1988).
52. Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm. of the President’s Private
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
53. Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
No. C99-1165R, 1999 WL 33526001, *7 (W.D. Wash. 1999).
54. Pub. Citizen, 708 F. Supp. at 364.
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committee member selection, fair balance, conflicts of interest,
and bias reflect the legal requirements of FACA section 15.
They require that committees contain an “appropriate range of
expertise for the task” and a “balance of perspectives,” while
striving to avoid conflicts of interest where possible. 55 These
policies permit committees to include members who are biased
or have expressed a strong opinion on a particular issue of
interest. According to the NAS process for committee
appointment, “[a] point of view or bias is not necessarily a
conflict of interest.” 56 IOM recognizes that member bias is not
only permissible, it is sometimes necessary. According to the
NAS Policy on Committee Composition and Balance, “[f]or
some studies . . . it may be important to have an ‘industrial’
perspective” if such a perspective is “vital to achieving an
informed, comprehensive, and authoritative understanding and
analysis of the specific problems and potential solutions to be
considered by the committee.” 57 However, IOM must balance
these perspectives to produce an overall objective committee
and avoid bias or the perception of bias. If these individuals
have conflicts of interest, they may nevertheless be included on
the committee to provide needed expertise, knowledge, balance,
or perspective. In such cases, the conflict of interest is
“unavoidable” and simply must be disclosed. 58
A brief examination of recent IOM activities reveals a
number of committees in which industry members and/or
members with conflicts of interest were included. Out of ten
current or recent FDA-sponsored IOM activities, at least half
contain members with industry background and at least three
committees contain members with disclosed conflicts of
interest. 59 For example, the IOM committee on Qualification of

55. NAT’L ACADS., OUR STUDY PROCESS: ENSURING INDEPENDENT,
OBJECTIVE
ADVICE
2
(n.d.),
available
at
http://www.nationalacademies.org/studycommitteprocess.pdf.
56. Committee
Appointment
Process,
NAT’L
ACADS.,
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/information.aspx?key=Committee_Appo
intment (last visited April 25, 2011).
57. NAT’L ACADS., supra note 48 at 3 (2003).
58. Id.
59. About
Activities,
INST.
MED.,
http://www.iom.edu/Activities.aspx?search=%22food%20and%20drug%20admi
nistration%22 (search performed April 26, 2011). Disclosures of committee
member conflicts of interest are only available for current projects, but not
recently completed projects, so there may have in fact been more than three
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Biomarkers and Surrogate Endpoints in Chronic Disease
includes a Vice President at Merck & Co. 60 The committee on
Accelerating Rare Diseases Research and Orphan Product
Development includes a former Vice President of Medtronic,
Inc., and a former Senior Vice President of Pfizer. 61 The
committee on Review of the Food and Drug Administration’s
Role in Ensuring Safe Food includes the Senior Vice President
and Chief Scientific and Regulatory Affairs Officer of the
Grocery Manufacturers Association. 62 Clearly, individuals with
industry background or connections are frequently deemed
valuable and necessary for IOM committees to fulfill their
functions, despite obvious conflicts of interest. Thus, it is not so
rare that individuals with “unavoidable” conflicts of interest
are included on IOM committees.
In summary, IOM committees must be fairly balanced to
perform their functions. They must include all essential areas
of expertise, balance the biases and perspectives of their
members, and disclose any unavoidable conflicts of interest.
IV. ANALYSIS OF IOM’S 510(K) COMMITTEE
The key question we pose is whether the existing IOM
Committee on the Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA
510(k) Clearance Process has the appropriate representation to
fulfill its mission and to satisfy the minimal requirements of
FACA Section 15. The twelve-member committee is currently
comprised of five physicians, three lawyers, and several
academics with selected technical backgrounds. 63 The
recent committees involving disclosed conflicts of interest.
60. See Evaluation of Biomarkers and Surrogate Endpoints in Chronic
Disease, INST. MED., http://iom.edu/Reports/2010/Evaluation-of-Biomarkersand-Surrogate-Endpoints-in-Chronic-Disease.aspx (last updated Feb. 4, 2011),
for list of committee members.
61. See Accelerating Rare Diseases Research and Orphan Product
MED.,
Development,
INST.
http://iom.edu/Activities/Research/OrphanProductResearch.aspx (last updated
Jan. 25, 2011), for list of committee members.
62. See Review of the Food and Drug Administration’s Role in Ensuring
MED.,
Safe
Food,
INST.
http://iom.edu/Activities/Nutrition/FDARoleReview.aspx (last updated Sept.
14, 2010), for list of committee members.
63. Committee: Public Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance
ACADS.
(Feb.
22,
2010)
Process,
NAT’L
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/CommitteeView.aspx?key=49181. Areas
of technical expertise include orthopedic focused tissue engineering and
software engineering.
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Committee does not include:
Innovators and inventors who have created new device
products under current FDA systems; 64
• Product developers who have brought products
from concept to market through the FDA approval
processes;
• Entrepreneurs
• Venture capitalists, investment bankers, or angel
investors with experience financing new medical
device innovations;
• Individuals
who
routinely
prepare
510(k)
applications;
• Management or other professionals from the
medical device industry; or
• Patients or patient advocates.
To assess the adequacy of the Committee’s current
composition, we look at the Committee’s function. FDA asked
the Committee to address two critical questions: (1) does the
current 510(k) process optimally protect patients and (2) does
the current 510(k) process promote innovation in support of
public health? 65
The Committee was explicitly asked to provide
recommendations as to how FDA can best optimize patient
protection (i.e. minimize risks to patients) while also promoting
innovation (i.e. improve the speed and affordability of access to
innovative new products). To do this, the Committee must
necessarily confront complex policy considerations, balance
64. One committee member, Dr. Lazar Greenfield, is credited with
inventing the life-saving Greenfield vena cava filter. See Activity: Public
Health Effectiveness of the FDA 510(k) Clearance Process, INST. MED.,
http://www.iom.edu/Activities/PublicHealth/510KProcess.aspx (last updated
Jan. 28, 2011). However, this invention was introduced in 1973, before there
was separate regulation of medical devices by the FDA. See Ken Garber, The
Clot Stopper, 22 INVENTION & TECHNOLOGY MAGAZINE (Summer 2006),
available
at
http://beta2.americanheritage.com/articles/magazine/it/2006/1/2006_1_34.shtm
l (describing the invention of the Kimray-Greenfield filter in the early 1970s
and stating that “at the time, the Food and Drug Administration did not have
to approve medical devices . . . “). The subsequent major changes to the
Greenfield filter occurred after Boston Scientific acquired the device—and
although Dr. Greenfield made suggestions to improve the filter’s design, it was
Boston Scientific that navigated the FDA’s regulatory process. Cf. Ken Garber,
supra (describing the company’s subsequent changes to the filter).
65. See Public Health Effectiveness, supra note 26.
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competing objectives and address politically significant
questions of patient autonomy, beneficence, and medical ethics.
These include questions about when the patient should have
the right to access some particular device despite known risks
and under what circumstances the FDA should intervene to
make that decision for the patient by barring access to the
device. IOM’s charge also includes understanding how
regulation impacts the complex innovation ecosystem.
Innovation is more than just invention—it includes the entire
cycle starting from invention, research and development,
financing,
manufacturing,
marketing,
and
societal
improvement. 66 This requires an understanding of innovation,
finance, entrepreneurship, product development and regulatory
process. Consequently, the function of the IOM Committee is
considerably more “diverse and far-reaching” than it is “narrow
and specific” or highly technical, and thus requires broader
expertise.
Committee membership must have the expertise to answer
both these questions. Unfortunately, it does not. First, it is
evident that the Committee lacks some of the expertise needed
to render advice on patient safety, an undoubtedly broad public
issue that requires diverse representation, including
representation from patients and industry. Those who invent,
finance, develop, test, and manufacture medical devices have
much needed expertise as to how to ensure the safety of those
devices. They offer valuable perspectives on the types of
research systems, manufacturing controls, testing strategies,
and design processes that may enhance patient safety. These
stakeholders, who are responsible for the invention, design,
development, testing and regulatory approval or clearance of
essentially all new devices in the United States, are omitted
from the Committee. As discussed below, the committee also
lacks any representation from patients— the ultimate
stakeholder in the balance between safety and access to new
products.
Second, as discussed above, innovation is the
transformation of an idea into a commercial product for the
66. See Larry Dignan, The Difference Between Innovation and Invention,
ZDNET (Mar. 7, 2007, 9:09 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/the-differencebetween-innovation-and-invention/4610; see also William Buxton, Innovation
vs. Invention, ROTMAN MAGAZINE, Fall 2005, at 52, 52 (“Innovation is far more
about prospecting, mining, refining and adding value than it is about pure
invention.”).
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advancement of society. IOM cannot adequately address
medical device innovation without insights from entrepreneurs
and others who have been involved in the medical device
industry— including people who have conceptualized products,
designed and developed those products, obtained financing for
new product lines, manufactured those products, and brought
those products to market. Even the FDA has highlighted the
importance of the medical device industry in innovation. In a
presentation made to the annual meeting of the Food and Drug
Law Institute, the Director of the FDA’s Center for Devices and
Radiological Health (CDRH) explicitly recognized the vital role
of industry in medical device innovation, stating, “U.S. medical
device development and innovation is an ecosystem with
shared responsibilities—to remain healthy it needs a strong
device industry, a strong U.S. research system, and a strong
FDA.” 67 But the IOM committee lacks any member with this
industry expertise. Without this experience, the committee
cannot adequately assess the effects of FDA regulations on
innovation. Indeed, this committee is precisely one for which it
is crucial to have an “industrial” perspective to achieve an
“informed, comprehensive, and authoritative understanding
and analysis of the specific problems and potential solutions to
be considered by the committee.” 68
Furthermore, while the Committee includes individuals
with expertise in clinical patient care, actual patients or
patient advocates are conspicuously not represented on the
Committee. The patient is the ultimate stakeholder, the one
most affected by policy decisions implicating safety and access
to devices. Optimally balancing safety and risk with innovation
raises important ethical questions of patient autonomy.
Presumably, the patient should have some input as to when
and how the FDA may regulate access to life-saving or lifeimproving medical devices. But the committee includes no
patient or patient advocate. This omission is confusing and
difficult to justify. While the committee does include a number
of physicians, they cannot speak for the patient—the patient,
not the doctor, is the ultimate decision-maker. 69
67. Jeffrey Shuren, 2011: The State of CDRH, Presentation at the Food
and Drug Law Institute Annual Meeting (April 5–6, 2011) (presentation slides
available from the Food and Drug Law Institute).
68. NAT’L ACADS., supra note 48 at 3.
69. See Amir Halevy, Medical Futility, Patient Autonomy, and
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Others have also noted these critical gaps in the
Committee’s composition. The CDRH director recently testified
before Congress that the Committee lacks inventors,
innovators, financing experts, industry representatives, and
actual patients. 70 Various members of Congress have also
expressed concern regarding these omissions, urging for more
transparent processes and opportunities for substantive and
meaningful input from all affected stakeholders. 71 Thus, while
each current committee member is individually impressive and
has expertise worthy of inclusion on the committee, without
this broader membership, the committee is inadequate to fulfill
its mission.
Additionally, this IOM committee lacks fair balance of
perspectives. As previously noted, IOM committees can include
individuals with preexisting biases, provided that there are
also
countervailing
viewpoints
on
the
committee.
Unfortunately, the 510(k) Committee does not include this
balance. For instance, one committee member spent almost
twenty years at the national public interest law firm Public
Citizen Litigation Group, whose motto is “Defending
Democracy. Resisting Corporate Power.” 72 Public Citizen is
highly critical of the 510(k) process, asserting that medical
devices are approved too quickly, allowing dangerous devices
enter the market. 73 While this member’s participation and
viewpoint is certainly appropriate, the lack of an opposing
viewpoint on the Committee renders the committee unbalanced
and risks both perceived and actual bias.
Professional Integrity: Finding the Appropriate Balance, 18 HEALTH MATRIX:
J. L.-MED., 261 266 (2008) (“In both medical ethics and health law, patient
autonomy has replaced medical paternalism as the dominant decision-making
model.”); see also Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Compliance with Advance
Directives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 133 & n.2 (2008) (explaining that “physician
paternalism has been widely rejected”).
70. Impact of Medical Device Regulation on Jobs and Patients: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Jeffrey Shuren), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm243716.htm.
71. See Letter from Sen. John Kerry to Margaret Ann Hamburg, supra
note 12.
72. PUB. CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org (last visited May 9, 2011).
73. Hines et al., supra note 26; Device and Diagnostic Policy, PUB.
CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/Page.aspx?pid=2505 (last visited May 9, 2011);
Press Release, Public Citizen, FDA Dodges Responsibility Regarding Medical
Device Approval, Defers to IOM: Statement of Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Director,
Public
Citizen’s
Health
Research
Group
(Jan.
19,
2011),
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=3261.

746

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 12:2

Furthermore, IOM could have avoided the gaps in
expertise and lack of balance by including any one of a number
of highly qualified people, including current NAS members and
past IOM committee members. 74 IOM also could have looked
beyond its membership to any one of a number of distinguished
experts and leaders in the medical device field to obtain the
required committee membership. IOM seemingly concluded in
this instance that this critical expertise could not be obtained
or was not needed, even though it has been necessary for many
other IOM committees. Even if the necessary experts all had
conflicts of interest, IOM could have simply disclosed these
conflicts as it has done so many times before. IOM’s failure to
do so has resulted in an incomplete and unbalanced committee,
lacking the necessary expertise to fulfill its function and
risking actual or perceived bias through a lack of balanced
perspectives.
These flaws threaten the integrity of the study and
undermine all of the hard work this committee has performed.
Ultimately, this committee fails to comply with FACA’s
requirements and FDA is therefore statutorily forbidden from
using any advice or reports this committee offers.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DICTATE A BALANCED
COMMITTEE
It is essential that the 510(k) Committee, as well as other
government-commissioned IOM committees, are unbiased,
balanced, include all necessary expertise, and comply with
FACA requirements. A failure to include appropriate
membership on IOM committees has significant implications
for the FDA, IOM, and the general public.
First, government agencies are expected to obtain complete
and accurate information from a variety of perspectives before
issuing regulations. The FDA is responsible for regulating the
production and marketing of all foods, drugs, medical devices,
cosmetics, and many other health products in the United
States. 75 Thus, the FDA has an enormous impact on the nation

74. See, e.g., supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
75. The Importance of Public Comment to the FDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143569.htm (last
updated May 1, 2009).
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and the public relies heavily upon its regulations. However, if
the FDA uses information from incomplete or one-sided
sources, not only might its ultimate decisions be uninformed,
but the public will lose trust in the agency. If FDA wants to use
IOM to analyze the 510(k) system, especially when
contemplating controversial changes to the system, the IOM
committee must include all necessary expertise and must be
unbiased and objective. Otherwise, it is both irresponsible and
illegal for FDA to use the IOM report, and FDA will risk losing
its authority and credibility.
Second, the value and quality of IOM’s work will suffer if
its committees are unbalanced or lacking in crucial expertise.
IOM is renowned for its thorough, robust, and objective
research and prides itself on being independent and
transparent. Its members are highly competent, respected, and
experienced professionals in their fields. But IOM’s welldeserved reputation and high caliber of its work product will
deteriorate if there is perceived or actual bias or if it failed to
include all critical perspectives. It is in IOM’s best interest to
address this issue now, before it damages its own reputation.
Third, if FDA can elect not to use official advisory
committees (which are subject to stricter FACA requirements
for public involvement and openness) and, instead, can rely on
IOM committees with no such requirements, then FDA can
completely circumvent FACA. FACA was enacted to increase
transparency in government decision making. Allowing FDA to
use IOM committees that are unaccountable to the public, the
government, or even its own institutional policies, clearly
contravenes FACA’s purpose. IOM committees must, at the
very least, comply with the minimal legal requirements that
apply to it.
Finally, much of what the 510(k) committee does is secret
already—deliberative meetings are closed, committee members’
resumes are not disclosed, and some material submitted to the
committee is confidential. Additionally, IOM does not make its
proposed recommendations available to the public for comment.
Therefore, it is especially important for IOM to comply with the
few openness and balance requirements under section 15. It is
insufficient to only allow stakeholder participation in other
steps of the process, such as data-gathering and reviewing. The
committee needs members on the inside who can provide muchneeded perspectives and experience where it is currently
lacking. Otherwise, critical expertise and viewpoints cannot be
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considered in any meaningful way and any final report will
have little credibility.
VI. CONCLUSION
The IOM 510(k) committee’s purpose is to evaluate the
510(k) pathway’s ability to advance medical device safety and
innovation. This requires broad committee membership,
including patients, inventors/innovators, entrepreneurs,
financiers and industry. Furthermore, the committee must be
fairly balanced to ensure its conclusions are objective and
accurate and to maintain public trust and accountability.
Unfortunately, the current committee does not contain all of
the required areas of expertise and is not fairly balanced. IOM
could have avoided these problems by simply including
qualified experts in these fields as it routinely does for other
committees, but it did not do so.
We have no idea of what the IOM 510(k) committee report
may say. We might agree with it or disagree it. Our concerns
and conclusions are based on serious gaps in the committee
composition, not any disagreement with the report content.
Regardless of the committee’s final conclusions, the committees’
omission of necessary expertise and perspectives is cause for
concern. Any committee reports and any of FDA’s subsequent
actions will be plagued by real or perceived bias, lack of
expertise and inaccuracy.
To avoid these problems, FACA prohibits FDA’s use of this
IOM committee. But we can’t unring a bell—once the
committee issues its report, we will never know whether FDA
saw it, read it, or used it. Anything FDA does thereafter can
then be challenged by a stakeholder asserting a violation of
FACA section 15. Thus, we should address this situation
immediately. Until this matter is resolved, IOM should not
issue any report from this committee. Otherwise, it will be
placing FDA in an impossible position, while simultaneously
damaging its own reputation for fairness, honesty, impartiality,
and accuracy.
Finally, the concerns raised here are not limited to only
IOM’s 510(k) committee—expertise, fairness and balance are
essential for all IOM committees. The public deserves nothing
less.

